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2Abstract
As of January 2006, the United States was the only major receiver of children through 
intercountry adoption that had not implemented the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry 
Adoption.  The U.S. signed the Hague Convention in 1994, but did not pass implementing 
legislation until 2000.  Regulations pursuant to the legislation were proposed in 2003, but final 
regulations did not go into effect until March 2006.  The slow pace was partly the result of 
Congressional wrangling over designation of a regulator and partly the result of a prolonged 
conversation between the designated regulator and the adoption community over specific 
regulations.  
Finalization of the regulation brings the Hague Convention into force in the United 
States, but the current system is inadequate to protect the rights of all children and families as the 
Hague Convention intends. Two parts of the regulations are problematic, especially in 
combination.  First, only substantial, not strict, compliance is required of adoption providers.  
Second, the U.S. encourages competition between accreditors of adoption providers.  We argue 
that the regulations will increase the costs of adoption services at the same time that quality, at 
best, will not improve.  We conclude that regulation of adoption should be centralized in order to 
comply with the intent of the Hague Convention. 
3I. Introduction
The 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption came into force in the United States in 
March 2006.1 Before 2006, the United States was the only country that annually received more 
than 1,000 intercountry adoptees that had not implemented the Hague Convention.2,3  The slow 
pace of implementation of the Hague Convention in the U.S. was partly the result of 
Congressional wrangling over the designation of a domestic “Central Authority” to regulate 
intercountry adoption, and partly the result of a prolonged conversation between the designated 
Central Authority and the adoption community over the specifics of the regulations.  Regulations 
were proposed in 2003, but progress towards finalization was halting.  
While finalizing the regulations brings the Hague Convention into force in the United 
States, the full benefits of the Hague Convention will not be realized with the system as it is 
currently envisioned.  We argue that the regulations will increase the costs of adoption services 
at the same time that quality, at best, will not improve.  We conclude that regulation 
(specifically, the monitoring of providers and the enforcement of standards) of the market for 
adoption services should be centralized in order to be consistent with the intent (and letter) of the 
Hague Convention. 
Two parts of the regulations are, in combination, problematic.  The first part is the 
performance criterion for adoption service providers.  Only substantial compliance is required; 
strict compliance is not required for accreditation.4  The second part is the law regarding the
selection of the accreditors of adoption service providers. The U.S. Central Authority encourages 
1
 The final regulations were published in the Federal Register 71(31), February 15, 2006.  State Department 22 CFR 
Parts 96, 97, and 98.
2
 Belgium ratified in 2005. For ratification dates and country-specific details see HccH, “Status Table.” Available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (accessed 9 May 2006).
3
  Jeff D. Opdyke, ‘Adoption's New Geography,’ Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 2003, D1. ("The U.S. adopts more foreign 
children than all other nations combined.").
4 Federal Register 68(178), September 15, 2003, Subpart E, section 96.27 (a).
4all interested parties to apply to become accreditors.5  The many accreditors will have 
overlapping jurisdictions and will compete for the business of the many adoption providers that 
seek accreditation.  Together, these two parts of the regulations will prevent the regulations from 
providing the assurance of the rights of children and families that the Hague Convention intends.
We begin by addressing the question of why regulation of the market for adoption 
services is desirable, whether the regulation is on a local, national, or international level.  Next, 
we present a brief history of the international movement to regulate intercountry adoption, as 
expressed in the Hague Convention on intercountry adoption.  Following this brief account of the 
development of the Hague Convention, we discuss U.S. efforts to ratify the Convention, 
including the specific regulations finalized in 2006.  Finally, we show that while, in general, the 
regulation of adoption has the potential to produce the desired results, the specific regulations are 
unlikely to do so.
II. Economic Rationale for Regulation of Adoption Services
Economists identify three main rationales for regulation: monopolistic abuse, imperfect 
information, and the existence of external effects or public goods.6  In these three kinds of 
market failure the unregulated outcome fails to produce the optimal quantity or quality of the 
good or service.  Regulation can move the outcome towards the optimal quantity or quality in the 
cases.  Parties to the Hague Convention agree to enact regulation to solve the problems of 
imperfect information and public goods aspects in the market for adoption services.
A. Public Good Aspect
5 Federal Register 68(178), September 15, 2003, Subpart B, section  96.4.  Private accreditors must be non-profit.
6
 For a thorough review of the literature on the political causes of regulatory policy see Roger G. Noll, “Economic 
Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation,” in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.) Handbook of Industrial 
Organization, Volume II (Elsevier Science Publishers, 1989), 1254-1287.
5Economic theory postulates that goods and services that produce satisfaction only for the people 
who consume and produce them are most efficiently produced by private firms in unregulated 
markets.  Consumption of each of these “private” goods is limited to the individual consumer (or 
a well-defined group of consumers), and the production and consumption of private goods does 
not affect other people.  Not so with adoption services.  When an adoption takes place, the wider 
society—in both the sending and the receiving country—is affected.  Parental rights are 
exchanged, the definition of family is transformed, and the sending society loses a potentially 
productive future worker while the receiving society gains one.
Moreover (as the cases of the moratoria on intercountry adoption from Romania and 
Cambodia demonstrate),7 the market for adoption services relies on a service it cannot provide 
itself—the protection of the rights of children and families involved in adoption.  The protection 
of the rights of children and families has benefits to society that are greater than the benefits to 
any single individual.  Further, the protection of rights is non-rival and non-excludable.  That is, 
everyone benefits from the protection of rights, even those who do not adopt.  Thus, the 
protection of rights in adoption is a public good.  We know that public goods are under-provided 
by markets, which is why public goods are usually closely regulated, or even directly produced 
by governments.8,9  The protection of rights in adoption, if achieved through the regulation of 
adoption services, is therefore likely to increase the number of intercountry adoptions.
7
  The State Department has information on the Romanian moritorium at 
http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/notices/notices_2211.html (accessed 6 May 2006).  Information about the 
investigation of adoption practice in Cambodia can be found at  
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/international.html (accessed 10 May 2006).
8
 The protection of rights in adoption also meets the definition of a global public good, similar to peace, distributive 
justice, and environmental integrity.  See Inge Khaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern (eds.), Global Public 
Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, published for The United Nations Development Programme 
by (New York: Oxford University Press 1999). 
9
 Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 202, 115 Stat. 38, 47 (codified at 
I.R.C. 23, 137 (2000)).
6B. Imperfect Information Aspect
In some markets, producers have more knowledge than consumers about the quality of the
product or service provided.  When the information about the quality of a product or service is 
complex and expensive to collect, consumers may not, despite their best efforts, be able to 
discover all they need to know in order to make well-informed decisions.  The imperfect 
information rationale has been the historical motivation for regulation of consumer products, 
workplaces, and occupations.10
The imperfect information problem in adoption arises because it is difficult for 
prospective adoptive parents to know whether an adoption service provider has high ethical 
standards.11  Specifically, prospective adoptive parents may be concerned that (1) an adoption 
service provider only places children who are truly legally available for adoption, (2) that the 
adoption service providers are interested primarily in finding the best “match” of family for a 
child, and (3) that the adoption service providers are not charging or condoning the payment of 
fees beyond the cost of providing adoption services.
Regulation can improve the outcome of markets with imperfect information,12 such as the 
market for adoption services, in two ways.  First, the government can set minimum standards, 
which protects consumers from the hazards of consuming low-quality products or services.  In 
the case of adoption, the minimum standards are stated in terms of ethical social work practice.  
Second, government can compel producers to disclose information about the quality of their 
products and services, thus increasing the amount of information available to consumers and 
10
 Howard K. Gruenspecht and Lester B. Lave, “The Economics of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 
in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume II (Elsevier Science 
Publishers, 1989), 1508- 1550.
11 See Schweitzer, Harvey, and Daniel Pollack, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Adoption Social Work, 44 Family 
Court Review 2, 258-269.
12 See e.g., Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children's Right's 
Perspective, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 1 (2003).
7decreasing the cost to consumers of obtaining the information.  In the case of adoption, the 
regulatory remedy is a required audit of adoption service providers that explicitly accounts for 
the legality of placements, the internal matching criteria, and the disbursement of all fees 
collected and donations accepted.    
III. History of International Regulation of Intercountry Adoption
Prior to 1989, there existed only regional agreements regarding intercountry adoption, which 
were enacted by countries in the Americas and western and northern Europe.13  But because 
many adoption service providers operate in many countries at the same time, and because many 
intercountry adoptions involve several jurisdictions, regional agreements did not suffice.14  In the 
late 1980s, the United Nations began an effort to establish an international basis for the 
regulation of intercountry adoption.15,16
A. Involvement of the Hague
The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) explicitly 
acknowledges the importance of intercountry adoption to children and families.17  The preamble 
13 See Daniel Pollack, Moshe Bleich, Charles J. Reid, Jr. & Mohammad H. Fadel, “Classical Religious Perspectives 
of Adoption Law”, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 718 (2004).
14 See Joanne Selinske et al., “Ensuring the Best Interest of the Child in Intercountry Adoption Practice: Case 
Studies from the United Kingdom and the United States”, 80 Child Welfare 656 (2001).
15
 For a discussion of the need for international cooperation, see Ethan Kapstein, “The Baby Trade,” 82 Foreign 
Affairs 6 (November/December) 2003, 115-125.
16
 See E. Wayne Carp, Family Matters: Secrecy and Disclosure in the History of Adoption (Harvard University 
Press, 1998); Joan Heifetz Hollinger, “Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice,” in 1 Adoption Law and Practice 
1-19 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2000). See generally Berend Hovius, Family Law: Cases, Notes and Materials
915-78 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing Canadian adoption law); Elizabeth Bartholet, “International Adoption: Propriety, 
Prospects and Pragmatics”, 13 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law. 181 (1996) (describing the problems with 
international adoptions and how international law attempts to balance the interests of those countries that demand 
adoption and those countries that supply the children to be adopted). 
17
 For a complete discussion of the UNCRC as the foundation for the Hague Convention, see William Duncan 
(1994), “The protection of children’s rights in intercountry adoption,” in L. Hefferman (ed), Human Rights—A 
European Perspective (The Round Hall Press/Irish Centre for European Law) and G. Parra-Aranguren (1998), “La 
tarea complementaria de le Convencion de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos del Nino realizada por las 
Convenciones de la Conferencia de Law Haya de Derecho Internacional Privado,” in Revista de la Facultad de 
Ciencias Juridicas y Politicas (106).
8to the UNCRC expresses the right of the child to grow up “in a family environment, in an 
atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.”  Article 20 of the UNCRC recognizes that 
when birth families are unable to provide a suitable environment, alternative care—including 
adoption—should be sought.  The UNCRC also explicitly acknowledges the importance of 
national and international regulation of adoption in order to protect the rights of children and 
families.  Article 21 requires states that allow adoption to take steps to be certain that adoption 
serves the best interests of the child.  Moreover, the UNCRC posits that children involved in 
intercountry adoption are entitled to protections “equivalent to those existing in the case of 
national adoption.”18
The Hague Conference on Private International Law began to consider what was to 
become its thirty-third Convention in January 1988.  The representatives of Hague-member 
countries believed that the problems in intercountry adoption went beyond the problems 
addressed by the 1965 Hague Convention on adoption which addressed the Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions.  The work of drafting the 
Convention began in October 1988.  Both Hague member states and non-member states 
participated in drafting the Convention.  The Convention was unanimously approved on 28 May 
1993.19
Worldwide acceptance and ratification of the Hague Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry has been extraordinary swift by historical 
18
  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention #33, Convention on the Protection of Children and 
Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, Article 21(c) <
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69> (last accessed 9 May 2006).
19
 G. Parra-Aranguern, Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Explanatory Report on the Convention on 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption,” <
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=2279&dtid=3> (last accessed 9 May 2006).
9standards.20  By September 2000, 41 countries had become contracting states.  As of February  
2006, 65 states had ratified or acceded to the Convention.21  The states included a wide variety of 
sending and receiving countries; a partial list is given in Table 1.  
B. Goals of the Convention
The specific provisions of the Convention are intended to encourage a more child-centered 
practice in intercountry adoption.22  The intent is to focus adoption practitioners on finding an 
appropriate placement for each waiting child and to limit the extent to which the practice of 
intercountry adoption focuses upon the quest of prospective adopters to find a child.
During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of cases of trafficking in children were revealed in 
the international press.  These cases included the sale of children by parents and orphanages, as 
well as the abduction of children for the purpose of adoption.23  Arguably the most important 
goal of the Hague Convention is the prevention of such abuses.24  Establishing a system of 
international cooperation for the prevention of abuse is a responsibility of countries under the 
UNCRC.25  Pursuant to this goal, the Hague Convention delegates the responsibility for ensuring 
proper consent to the adoption to the country of origin.26
The Hague Convention also seeks to remove incentive for parent-centered practice on 
intercountry adoption by prohibiting financial gain from adoption, including payments to birth 
20
  William Duncan, “The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption”, in Peter Selman (ed.), Intercountry adoption: developments, trends, and perspectives.  (London: British 
Agencies for Adoption and Fostering), 40-52.
21
 The Hague Conference regularly updates its list of contracting states on its website: <
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69> ( accessed 9 May 2006).
22
 Duncan, see above n 20, ,46-47.
23
  The scandals are summarized in Ethan B. Kapstein, “The Baby Trade” 82 Foreign Affairs 6, see especially p. 
119.
24
 Article 1 and Article 21(c).
25
 UNCRC Articles 20-21. Text available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm (last accessed 10 May 
2006).
26
 Article 4(c): “persons, institutions and authorities have given their consent freely, in the required legal form, and 
expressed or evidenced in writing.  Article 4(d) expresses a similar requirement for consent of the child, when 
appropriate.  
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parents and institutions beyond actual costs incurred, such as provision of social services, travel, 
and child support for the pre-adoption period. 27, 28
At the same time that prohibiting financial gain from adoption protects the rights of 
adopted children, the measure also protects the rights of adoptive parents.  Congressman 
Benjamin Gilman expressed it this way: “These standards will provide parents with the 
confidence that this emotional undertaking will not leave them open to fraud or abuse.”29
Accreditation of adoption agencies under the Hague Convention is intended to require full 
financial disclosure, so that practices such as outright extortion and mandatory “donations” can 
be curbed.30
Finally, in addition to the ethical goals of preventing abduction, trafficking and improper 
financial gain, it is hoped that the provisions of the Hague Convention will reduce “delays, 
complications and [the] considerable costs” of intercountry adoption.31  Domestic law under the 
Hague Convention is required to clarify the status of the adopted child in the receiving country to 
“streamline documentary requirements” for immigration of the adopted child.32
To achieve its goals, the Hague Convention requires each contracting state to designate a 
Central Authority.  The division of responsibilities between Central Authorities in the sending 
and receiving states is given is clearly articulated.  It is the responsibility of the sending state to 
“ensure that the child is adoptable, that due consideration has been given to the possibilities for 
27
 Article 4(c):  the consents [of parents, institutions and authorities] have not been induced by payment or 
compensation of any kind…”  Article 4(d) similarly requires that, when the consent of the child is appropriate, the 
consent not be induced by payment.   Article 8 requires Central Authorities to “prevent improper financial or other 
gain.  Article 28 is more specific, confining the exchange of monies to costs and expenses (including reasonable 
professional fees) and limiting the earnings of adoption service providers. 
28 Ethan B. Kapstein, “The Baby Trade”, 82 Foreign Affairs 6 (2003): 115-125.
29
 Benjamin A. Gilman at US Congress Hearing October 20 1999. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives (2000).  
Implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.  Hearing before the Committee on International 
Relations.  Wednesday, October 20, 1999.  Serial No. 106-110.  Available: 
http://www.house.gov/internationalrelations [accessed March 4, 2004].
30
  Hague Convention, Article 11
31
 Duncan, see above n. 20, 47.
32
  IAA section 302 amends the Immigration and Nationality Act section 204(d)(2)).. 
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placement of the child in that state, that an intercountry adoption is in the child’s best interests, 
and that the relevant consents have been freely given.”33  It is the responsibility of the receiving 
state to “determine that the prospective adopters are eligible and suitable to adopt, that they have 
been appropriately counseled, and that the child will be authorized to enter and reside 
permanently in that state.” 34, 35
IV. History of U.S. Regulation of Intercountry Adoption Services
In the United States, the regulation of adoption services, including intercountry adoption 
services, has not been directly regulated by the federal government.  Federal involvement in 
adoption has been limited to the financing of adoptions of children in foster care who cannot 
return to their birth families and to tax deductions and credits for adoptive families.36  Like most 
family law, law concerning the regulation of providers of adoption services has been left to the 
states.  Each state licenses agencies and social workers using its own guidelines;37 each state has 
its own rules regarding relinquishment and parental consent; each state has its own rules 
regarding what payments adoptive parents may make to birth parents.38
33 Article 28.  Duncan, see above n 20, 44.
34 Article 28. Duncan, see above n 20, 44.
35
  National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, The Adoption Home Study Process, at
http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/f_homstu.cfm (last accessed 2 May 2006). 
36
  Federal laws financing adoption from foster care include: Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption 
Reform Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-266 Section 203), The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-
272), Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-89). Federal tax law regarding adoption includes: 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34 Section 125), Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514), Minimum 
Wage Increase Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-188 Section 1807),Tax Relief Act (P.L. 107-16, Title II, Section 202).
37
 Best practice guidelines are updated and published by the Child Welfare League of America, CWLA Standards of 
Excellence for adoption services (Rev. ed.) (Washington, DC: CWLA, 2000). 
38
 Naomi R. Cahn and Joan Heifetz Hollinger (eds.), Families by Law (New York: New York University Press, 
2004); Richard Leiter (ed.) National Survey of State Laws (Detroit: Thompson Gale, 2003); Stephen Macedo and 
Iris Marion Young (eds.), Child, Family and State (Yew York: New York Univ. Press, 2003); Sarah H. Ramsey and 
Douglas E. Abrams, Children and the Law in a Nutshell (St. Paul, MN: Whomson/West, 2003); Barbara R. Hauser 
and Julie A. Tigges, Women’s Legal Guide (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publ, 1996); Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Law 
and Practice (New York: M. Bender, 1988).  For a less academic approach, see American Bar Association, The 
American Bar Association Guide to Family Law: The complete and easy guide to all the laws of marriage, 
parenthood, separation and divorce (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1996).  Also see, Madelyn 
Freundlich and Lisa Peterson, Wrongful Adoption: Law, Policy and Practice (Washington DC: CWLA Press 1998).
12
A. Designating a Regulator
Given the limited role of the federal government in adoption law, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the United States took so long to bring the Hague Convention into force.  The U.S. signed the 
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption in 1993.  After seven years and extensive 
Congressional hearings, the International Adoption Act (IAA) of 2000 was signed by President 
Clinton.  A primary stumbling block for passage of implementing legislation was the designation 
of a Central Authority.  The IAA designated the Department of State (as opposed to the 
Department of Health and Human Services) as the Central Authority for the U.S. in matters of 
intercountry adoption.  The Department of Health and Human Services has direct experience 
with social work best practice, including adoption practice.  Further, the Department of Health 
and Human Services has experience with the regulation and accreditation of health care facilities.  
While the both Departments supported the designation of DHHS as Central Authority,39
Congress chose the Department of State because of its experience “on the ground” in sending 
countries.40  State Department personnel process orphan visas for the travel of the adoptees of 
U.S. citizens, and the State Department has been involved in evidence gathering and prosecution 
of cases of intercountry child abduction and trafficking.   
39
 In fact, a representative of the State Department testified before Congress that the Department has no experience 
in child welfare or human services and has no first-hand knowledge of the myriad ways in which intercountry 
adoptions are facilitated (US Congress Hearing October 20, 1999).
40
 The Senate and the House versions of the bill originally designated different Central Authorities.  S 682 (wanted 
State), HR 2342 (wanted State), and HR 2909 (wanted HHS).  Some members of Congress felt very strongly that 
HSS would not be able to incorporate the duties of Central Authority.  See comments of Richard Burr (NC), US 
Congress Markup March 22 2000 and US Congress Hearing October 20, 1999. However, the policy question here is 
one of public perception of the relative ability (in other words, the credibility) of the two departments.  See also the 
testimony of Mary A. Ryan, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, US Dept of State at US Congress Hearing 
October 20, 1999: “The Administration strongly believes that the accrediting function should rest with the 
Department of Health and Human Services…as the only Federal Government agency with relevant experience in 
evaluating and working with domestic adoption programs and social service providers, is better suited to handle this 
function than the Department of State…It has the experience, it has the knowledge, and it best for the children.”
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Once it was designated Central Authority, the State Department set about the task of 
writing the specific regulations to fulfill its responsibilities.41  Because of its lack of experience 
in the fields of social work and accreditation, the State Department required a significant amount 
of time for information gathering.  Information gathering was conducted under contract with the 
private consulting firm Acton-Burnell.  Acton-Burnell was well known to the State Department 
but was not well-versed in adoption.  The input of researchers, adoption agencies, adoptive 
parents and adoptees was gathered, and public meetings were held during the process of drafting 
the regulations.42 After three years the State Department published its draft of proposed specific 
regulations.43
Some observers of adoption policy have been frustrated by the regulations by what they 
believed to be misinterpretations of the IAA and the Hague Convention in the proposed 
regulation.44  Furthermore, at a public meeting at the State Department on 10 November 2003, a 
number of small agencies expressed frustration with the State Department for not reaching out 
more visibly to the entirety of the adoption community.  The State Department responded to the 
41
 Almost all of the Central Authorities designated by states contracting to the Hague Convention are human services 
agencies or adoption-specific agencies.  See HccH, “Authorities”, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.authorities&cid=69 (last accessed 10 May 2006).
42
 Summaries of the meetings and some documents are available at the Hague Adoption Standards Project Website 
at http://www.hagueregs.org/ (last accessed 10 May 2006).
43
  Department of State, 22 CFR Parts 96 and 98, “Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption; Intercountry 
Adoption Act of 2000; Accreditation of Agencies; Approval of Persons; Preservation of Convention Records; 
Proposed Rules,” Federal Register, September 15, 2003.
44
  For example, Hogan, M. , Gibbs, P., Greenman, F., Hoard, C., Margolies, L. & Wei, A., “Comments to the 
Department of State on Proposed Regulations: Intercountry Adoption,” Center for Adoption Research, 
http://www.centerforadoptionresearch.org/ (last accessed 11 January 2005); Maureen Hogan, “The Struggle 
Between Families and Adoption Providers Over the Hague Convention, Center for Adoption Research, 
http://www.centerforadoptionresearch.org/ 
default.asp?action=article&ID=39&CategoryID=26&CategoryName=Federal (last accessed 11 January 2005); 
various authors and documents on the website of the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute at  
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/policy/hagueregs.html (last accessed 11 January 2005).
14
frustration of these parties by extending the public comment period from three months to four 
months.  In January 2005, the State Department issued its responses to the comments.45
B. Specifics of the Regulation
Some aspects of the implementation of the Intercountry Adoption Act have been uncontroversial.  
For example, while the Hague Convention makes verification of the consent of birth families the 
responsibility of the Central Authority in the sending country, the U.S. plans to double-check 
sending country efforts; to wit, the Intercountry Adoption Act adds two sections to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.46  The U.S. Attorney General will review intercountry 
adoption cases to confirm that the purpose of the adoption is to “form a bona fide parent-child 
relationship.”  Further, provisional upon U.S. Attorney General review of consents, the 
Intercountry Adoption Act allows for the immigration of children who are not technically 
orphans.  
Other aspects of the Intercountry Adoption Act have generated more heat.  For example, 
one of the issues that has bothered adoption services providers the most is the requirement that 
accredited providers prove that they are adequately insured for liability.47  However, in terms of 
achieving the goals of the Convention, the regulatory structure matters more than the 
performance requirements for individual adoption service providers.  
45
 U.S. Department of State, “Announcement of Publication on Department's Website Of Public Comments 
Received on Proposed Hague Regulations” at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/ 
implementation/implementation_1519.html (last accessed 11 January 2005).
46
  IIA sections 103 and 302, modifying the Immigration and Nationality Act section 101(b)(1)(G).  See U.S. 
Department of Justice (2001).  Immigration and Naturalization Service.  Fact Sheet. The Intercountry Adoption Act 
of 2000: Approval of the Hague Convention regarding intercountry adoptions.  Available: http://www.immigration
links.com/news/news980.htm [accessed May 13, 2004]. for a summary of these changes.
47
 Proposed regulations §96.45 and 96.46; IAA  §203 (b)(1)(E) require liability coverage of $1 million per 
occurance.  The final regulations §96.33(h) set liability requirements at $1 million per firm.
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The regulations rely on the IAA: “The Secretary [of State] may authorize public or 
private entities to perform appropriate central authority functions…”48  The responsibilities of 
the Central Authority, as well as public authorities and adoption service providers, are defined in 
Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Hague Convention.  Article 7 gives Central Authorities the non-
delegable job of coordination with the sending state.  Article 9 lists the jobs of day-to-day 
placement and reporting, which the Central Authority may undertake itself or delegate to either 
public authorities or “other bodies duly accredited [that is, adoption service providers].” 
Sandwiched between, Article 8 states, “Central Authorities shall take, directly or through public 
authorities, all appropriate measures to prevent improper financial or other gain in connection
with an adoption and to deter all practices contrary to the objects of the Convention.”  Article 8 
does not, therefore, appear on its face to allow the Central Authority to delegate the job of 
detection and deterrence of financial impropriety to a private firm.  But that is exactly what the 
IAA and the State Department regulations do.49  The regulations put the State Department at 
arm’s length from providers, as it delegates the job of front-line detection and prevention of 
abuses in intercountry adoption to (as yet to be named) accreditors, which may be public 
authorities such as state departments of child welfare services, but which may also include 
private firms such as the Council on Accreditation.
1. Accreditation vs. Licensure
Adoption service providers are currently regulated through licensure by the states, through the 
state departments of child welfare and protective services.  However, the majority of licensing 
48
 Section 102 (f) “Methods of Performing Responsibilities.” 
49
 The State Department acknowledged these objections in Federal Register 71(31) on February 15, 2006. II.A. and 
II.B.
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standards in the states concern domestic adoption, or are limited to activities within the state.50
Moreover, licensing standards vary widely, so that state licensing cannot be used as a meaningful 
national standard.  At a Congressional hearing in 1999, Hague Coordinator of the Joint Council 
on International Children’s Services Susan Freivalds testified that, “Although it would be 
convenient and easier for Joint Council agencies to rely only on State licensure, after six years of 
deliberation we have determined that State licensure does not rise to the level of quality standard 
that is needed for high quality intercountry adoption services.”51
In the regulations, the system of accreditation of adoption service providers that would 
facilitate intercountry adoptions in Hague contracting countries is separate and fundamentally 
different from the system of state licensure.  In fact, the system provided for by the IAA52 and 
fleshed out the State Department regulations53 is not a system of licensure at all, but a system of 
accreditation.  Accreditation, in the American sense of the word, is a method of industry self-
regulation.54
Under licensure, rules must be clearly stated and well-understood.  In theory, at least, 
there is little room for the licensor’s discretion in evaluating compliance.  Accreditation, on the 
other hand, specifically allows for a level of compliance that is indeterminate rather than fixed.  
In some cases, indeterminacy is an asset.  For example, in state corporate law, it is widely agreed 
50
 See testimony of Patricia Montoya, Commissioner for Children, Youth, and Families, Department of Health and 
Human Services at US Congress Hearing October 20, 1999.  U.S. Congress, House of Representatives (2000).  
Implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.  Hearing before the Committee on International 
Relations.  Wednesday, October 20, 1999.  Serial No. 106-110.  Available: 
http://www.house.gov/internationalrelations [accessed March 4, 2004].
51
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Congress Hearing October 20, 1999. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives (2000).  Implementation of the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption.  Hearing before the Committee on International Relations.  Wednesday, 
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  Daniel Pollack, “Does accreditation lead to best practice? Maybe”, 63 Policy & Practice 1 (2005), 26.
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that it is the indeterminacy of Delaware’s law regarding the fiduciary duties of corporations give 
the state an advantage in attracting corporations.55  The indeterminacy of the Delaware corporate 
rules allows judges to be sensitive to corporate needs, possibly at the expense of creditors and 
consumers.  Indeterminacy in adoption rules will allow accrediting agencies to be similarly 
sensitive to the needs of adoption service providers, possibly at the expense of children and 
prospective adoptive families.
There is some question as to whether regulation by accreditation in the American sense is 
what the framers of the Convention had in mind.  While “accreditation” is the vocabulary used in 
the English text of the Convention, the following excerpt from Article 10 of the Hague 
Convention defines regulation in terms of “competence,” a concept more akin to licensure: 
“accreditation shall only be granted to…bodies demonstrating their competence to carry out 
properly the tasks with which they may be entrusted (emphasis added).” 56,57
2. Substantial Compliance
The regulations58 require only that accredited bodies demonstrate substantial compliance with 
the standards of performance laid out in the document.59  The status of “accredited” will not, 
therefore, mean that an adoption service provider clearly has met all of the standards.  
“Accredited” will mean only that an adoption service provider has met most of the standards.  
Moreover, the definition of most may differ from accreditor to accreditor, and it is possible that 
accreditors may base their evaluations on whether an adoption service provider is moving 
55
 Kamar, Ehud (1998).  A regulatory competition theory of indeterminacy in corporate law.  98 Colum. L. Rev 
1908 (December).
56
 The State Department recognized this objection to the IAA and the regulations in Federal Register 71(31) on 
February 15, 2006, II.B.
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 For an extended critique see Hogan, M., Gibbs, P., Greenman, F., Hoard, C., Margolies, L. & Wei, A., 
“Comments to the Department of State on Proposed Regulations: Intercountry Adoption,” Center for Adoption 
Research, http://www.centerforadoptionresearch.org/ (last accessed 11 January 2005).
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towards compliance with standards, rather than actually complying with standards.  That 
accreditation is to be based upon substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, with the 
stated standards is one of the key flaws in the regulations, and is discussed in additional detail 
below.
3. Overlapping Jurisdictions and Competition between Accreditors
State departments of child welfare services, which, again, already license some adoption service 
providers in their states, may apply to the State Department to become accreditors.60  Under the 
regulations, the State Department may also authorize private firms to be accreditors.  There is no 
upper limit upon the number of accreditors that the State Department may authorize.  And there 
is no geographic limit to the “jurisdiction” of a private accreditor (although state departments of 
child welfare services may not compete with each other in jurisdiction.61  An adoption service 
provider will be able to choose its own accreditor from among many on the authorized list, and 
may even choose to switch accreditors when a re-accreditation is required at a later time if it 
desires.  In other words, there is not an assignment of accreditors to adoption service providers, 
but the “jurisdictions” of accreditors overlap, creating the potential for competition between 
accreditors.  
First, the State Department will face the logistical challenge and cost of maintaining and 
communicating with multiple accreditors.  The cost will be borne either by prospective adoptive 
families or by the taxpayers.  However, the cost of providing for competition between multiple 
accreditors will not be offset by the benefits of consistent quality in adoption services that can be 






The overlapping jurisdiction of accreditors provides incentive for competition.  Usually 
competition is beneficial to society because competition, all other things equal, leads to an 
efficient outcome.  In this case, adoption service providers will seek the services of an accreditor 
that maximizes the profits of the provider, or equivalently, that minimizes its cost of 
accreditation.  Standard microeconomic theory predicts that only the lowest cost accreditors 
would survive, so that adoptive families would pay the lowest possible amount for the assurance 
that adoption providers are on the up-and-up.  Recent work on the market for auditing services
indicates that, at least in theory, industry self-regulation (accreditation) can lead to efficient 
outcomes.62 This is, most likely, what the authors of the regulations had in mind.
However, the even if the competitive, efficient, lowest-cost outcome does obtain, the 
outcome will not also meet the goals of the Hague Convention.  It will not meet the goals
because there is no reason to expect all accreditors to provide exactly identical services.  In fact, 
the accreditors would have an incentive to be a little bit different from one other.  The 
“substantial compliance” requirement opens the door for this product differentiation.63
To simplify, imagine that accreditors come in two varieties: high-cost, high-quality, and
low-cost, low-quality.  Perhaps the high-quality accreditors have experience in accreditation in 
other industries, so people believe that they can do a more thorough job.  A high-quality 
62 Paul V. Dunmore and Haim Falk .  “Economic competition between professional bodies: The case of auditing.” 3 
American Law and Economics Review 2 (2001), 302-319.
63 Roberto Romano advocates this sort of “product differentiation” in regulation.  Romano advocates the substitution 
of a system of competing state regulations to supplant the federal monopoly on regulation of corporate securities 
issuance.  The idea is that with competition, states will develop laws that are in line with investor interests, which 
will lower the cost of capital, increase share value, and attract firms to the regulatory jurisdiction.  This will work 
only if investor interests are not subverted and asymmetric information problems are not persistent.  It will not work 
in regulation of intercountry adoption because of the severity of the asymmetric information problem and the 
pressure on agencies to control the price of adoption services.  Further financial capital is very mobile; provision of 
adoption services is less so, insofar as the same agency usually performs a home study, provides placement services, 
and post-placement services.  Provision of competent adoption services from afar would increase the cost 
significantly, offsetting any gains from increased confidence obtained from rule-shopping in a regime of competitive 
federalist adoption regulation. Romano, Roberta, "The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation" 
(July 2001). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-49; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 258. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=278728 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.278728.
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accreditor will be able to charge more for its services, as compared to a less reputable, lower-
quality accreditor.  Providers that use high-quality accreditors will, in turn, have an incentive to 
advertise that fact to families because the demand for quality in accreditation is a derived 
demand; that is, the willingness of an adoption provider to pay for accreditation will depend on 
how families value accreditation.  Some families are willing and able to pay more for adoption 
services that use high-quality accreditation.  Some families will not be able to pay more for high 
quality.  This subverts the intent of the Hague Convention, which is to ensure that all adoption 
service providers meet high standards so that the rights of all families and children are protected 
equally.64
It seems unlikely that the regulations will prevent the low-quality accreditors from 
accrediting low-quality providers.  First, again, the law only requires substantial compliance.  
Second, low quality accreditors and providers will persist because the standards to which 
providers will be held will be partly generated by the providers themselves; this is the American 
understanding of “accreditation” that is reflected in the fact that the regulations allow accreditors 
to have standards that differ from one another.  Third, the law enforcement role of the State 
Department is one-step removed from the accreditation process.65  If there is little threat of 
enforcement, some accreditors and providers will have little incentive to form strict standards 
and stick to them.  Fourth, providers that specialize in limited services, such as conducting only 
the home study or providing only the legal services, do not have to be independently 
64
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accredited.66  They can act as supervised subcontractors to accredited providers, and 
subcontractors will have little incentive to maintain high standards.67  Finally, providers are not 
required to provide all of their adoption-related information to accreditors, but are only required 
to provide the information regarding Hague Convention-covered adoptions.68  Under these 
regulations “mistakes” will be easily hidden.
The existence of both high-quality and low-quality accreditors will lead to one of two 
outcomes.  The first possibility is that low-cost, low-quality accreditors will supplant high-cost, 
high-quality accreditors. This “race to the bottom” is common in circumstances in which the 
quality of a good or service is unknown to the consumer before a transaction.69
Fortunately, the unsavory race-to-the-bottom outcome is unlikely.  So long as high-
quality accreditors can signal their quality directly to providers and at least indirectly to 
families—for example through reputation—both high quality accreditors and low quality 
accreditors will persist.  Families who are not willing or able to pay the higher cost of adoption 
services from a provider that uses a high-quality accreditor will be left with the services of 
providers that meet only the lower standards of the low-quality accreditors.  Caveat emptor.
But, of course, a caveat emptor system is what is in place today; it is the caveat emptor
system that has spawned the abuses in intercountry adoption that the Hague Convention and the 




 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 22(e) requires that “the placement of the child in another 
country is carried out by competent authorities or organs.”  This would seem to rule out the role of the independent 
person in ICA.  The inclusion in the Hague Convention of the provision to allow independent persons to operate 
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 Section 96.42.
69 Counterfiet currency is the staple example of a “race to the bottom”.  If enough counterfeit currency is available, 
people hold onto their “good” money and soon only counterfeit money will be in circulation.  The only way that 
good money stays in circulation is through extensive “central authority” efforts to detect and deter counterfeiting.
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process itself and supervision of accreditors by the State Department) that will be passed on to 
adoptive families and taxpayers, but provide only limited benefits to the adopted families, the 
adoptees, and society.
V. Effective Regulation of ICA 
The current regulations are unlikely to be effective in meeting the goals of Hague 
Convention.  Before advocating an alternative to the current regulations, it seems advisable to 
ask whether effective regulation of intercountry adoption is an attainable goal at all.  In this 
section, we use a recently developed political economy framework to show that effective 
regulation of adoption services is possible.
In their book on the success and failure of government policy, Amihai Glazer and 
Lawrence Rothenberg present a compelling case that the ability of government to achieve the 
objectives of policy depends upon four interrelated factors, which they term “economic 
constraints.”70  Economic constraints include the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
the policy objectives and whether there is the possibility of multiple equilibria in the outcomes of 
the behavior being regulated.71
The existence of multiple, self-sustaining equilibria is an important precondition for 
success of policy because then policy “can be viewed as an attempt to nudge behavior toward a 
particular equilibrium (p. 6).”  The current equilibrium in the market for intercountry (and also 
private domestic) adoption services is characterized by low quality providers operating side-by-
70
 Amihai Glazer and Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Why Government Succeeds and Why It Fails (Cambridge: Harvard 
university Press, 2001).  See especially the examples in chapter 3.
71
 Glazer and Rothenberg, see above n 70, also include as economic constraints the rational responses of the 
regulated and the public the possibility of crowding in and crowding out effects.  In our view, these two constraints 
are less important to the success of regulation of intercountry adoption services.  There is, however, a possibility for 
a crowding in effect and that deserves mention.  If the experiences of parents are more positive at agencies 
accredited to facilitate adoptions between Hague-ratifying countries than at non-accredited agencies that facilitate 
intercountry adoptions with non-Hague Convention countries, accredited agencies will attract more clients.
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side with high quality providers.  “Low quality” in this context refers to providers that violate the 
rights of adoptees or adoptive parents. The goal of the Hague Convention and its implementing 
legislation and regulations is to push the equilibrium in the market for intercountry adoption 
services in the direction of consistent “high quality,” an equilibrium in which the rights of all 
participants in an adoption are protected.  
Credible commitment refers to the ability of lawmakers and officials to convince others 
that the regulation will be taken seriously and that violations will be redressed.  To the extent that 
lawmakers and officials are subject to the influences of special interests and public opinion, 
government credibility can be questioned.  Credibility is important because it factors into the 
rational response of people to the policy.  When people weigh the costs and benefits of 
compliance with the policy, credibility affects the calculation by figuring into the probability that 
compliance will be worthwhile and the probability that non-compliance will be detected and 
punished.
Key to the success of regulation of intercountry adoption services is the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to the protection of the rights of children and parents in adoption. 
However, the commitment of the government to the protection of rights in adoption is not 
communicated clearly in the IAA or in the regulations.  The credibility of the government’s 
commitment to the goals of the Hague Convention is questionable on three grounds, which have 
already been discussed.  First is the decision to delegate regulatory authority to the Department 
of State rather than to the Department of Health and Human Services.  The second is the decision 
for US-style accreditation with a substantial compliance standard rather than a stricter licensing 
procedure.  The third is the decision for multiple accreditors with overlapping jurisdictions.  The 
first issue, choice of Central Authority, is less critical than the second two.  The Department of 
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State could attain credibility by adopting a model of centralized regulation of intercountry 
adoption services.
VI. Conclusion
Because both high-quality and low-quality accreditation exists in the market under the 
regulations, the rights of children and families (in the U.S. and in sending countries) will not be 
equally protected.  Equal protection is likely to require centralized accreditation standards and 
procedures.  In fact, centralization has been the norm when we seek to protect the human rights 
(like the right of workers to unionize or the civil rights of all citizens).  In these cases, regulation 
is held close, detection and enforcement occurs within a government department or commission.
Similarly, when the public gains from compelling information disclosure, regulation tends to be 
centralized.
For example, the regulators of intercountry adoption have a charge originating from the 
Hague Convention and the Intercountry Adoption Act that is similar to the charge of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission because regulation of both adoption and employment are 
primarily concerned with the protection of rights.  The charge to regulate adoption also has 
similarities to the charge of the Securities and Exchange Commission because the regulation of 
intercountry adoption is concerned with the ethical behavior and full financial disclosure.  Both 
the EEOC and the SEC are centralized systems that, despite recent problems, historically have 
demanded a high level of compliance.72
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Other countries have moved towards centralization in the regulation of adoption.  In the 
Netherlands, the Intercountry Child Welfare Organisation (now Worldchildren) was established 
under the Ministry of Justice in 1975.  It was hoped that the Child Welfare Organisation would 
have responsibility for all intercountry adoptions, but competition emerged.  During the 1980s 
there was an increase in concerns about the variability of standards between agencies.  In 
response, the Act on Intercountry Adoptions of 1988 set up centralized licensing requirements 
enforced by the Ministry of Justice.73
In the United Kingdom, the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act of 1999 “can be seen as 
attempting to use regulation to promote good practice in ICA” with a view towards controlling 
“thwarted adopters some of whom engage in abuses of various kinds.”74  The 1999 Act promotes 
centralization and limits competition in the provision of intercountry adoption services by 
prohibiting private home studies, and it reduces the temptations facing prospective adoptive 
parents by restraining the ability of judges to circumvent social work guidelines.75
A centralized regulator of intercountry adoption services would be able to compel strict 
compliance with uniform standards of adoption practice and would prevent competition from 
undermining the goals of the Hague Convention.76  Hopefully, a more centralized system of 
accreditation may yet emerge.  
Governments Do?” The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series # 1539, 1999; Sarah Wilhelm “The 
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Table 1: Parties to the Hague Convention
Highlighted: Major Receiving Countries




Entry into Force Central Authority
Belgium 27 Jan 99 26 May 
05
1 Sept 05 Service de l'Adoption internationale 
within the Service Public Fédéral 
Justice, additional authorities 
designated for each language 
community
Brazil 29 May 93 10 Mar 99 1 July  99 State Secretariat for Human Rights, 
Program for Cooperation on 
International Adoption and State 
Agencies
Bulgaria 27 Feb 01 15 May 
02
1 Sept 02 Ministry of Justice
Canada 12 Apr 94 19 Dec 96 1 Apr 97 (varies 
by Territory)
Human Resources Development & 
Territorial Ministries of Social 
Service
Denmark 2 Jul 97 2 Jul 97 1 Nov 97 Minister of Justice
Finland 19 Apr 94 27 Mar 97 1 July 97 Finnish Board of Intercountry 
Adoption Affairs
France 5 Apr 95 20 June 
98
1 Oct 98 Central Authority for Intercountry 
Adoption, whose secretariat is 
provided by the Mission de 
l’adoption international
Italy 11 Dec 95 18 Jan 00 1 May 00 National Board for Intercountry 
Adoptions




5 Dec 93 26 Jun 98 1 Oct 98 Ministry of Justice Prevention, Youth 
and Sanction Policy Department
Poland 12 June 95 12 June 
95
1 Oct 95 Ministry of Labor and Social Policy
Romania 29 May 93 28 Dec 94 1 May 95 Romanian Committee for Adoption
Sweden 10 Oct 96 28 May 
97




16 Jan 95 24 Sept 
02
1 Jan 03 Federal Office of Justice, Office for 
the International Protection of 
Children
must include foreign aid directed at reducing the poverty and conflict that makes children available for ICA in the 
first place.
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UK 12 Jan 94 27 Feb 03 1 June 03 Department of Health, Adoption and 
Permanence Team (Intercountry 
Section)
USA 31 Mar 94 n/a n/a n/a
Non-Member States
Columbia 1 Sept 93 13 July 98 1 Nov 98 Instituto Columbiano de Beinestar Familiar
Guatemala Accession 26 Nov 02 1 Mar 03 Procuraduria General de a Nacional
India 9 Jan 03 6 Jun 03 1 Oct 03 Central Adoption Resource Agnecy
Phillipines 17 Jul 95 2 Jul 96 1 Nov 96 Intercountry Adoption Board
As of 10 May 2006, the Russian Federation has signed but not yet ratified. Major sending 
countries that are not signatories include Cambodia, Haiti, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Ukraine, 
Vietnam.
Sources: HccH, “Status Table.” Available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (accessed 9 May 2006).  
HccH, “Authorities.”  Available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.authorities&cid=69 (accessed 9 May 2006).
